Abstract. The question `Do hens suffer in battery cages T is difficult to answer because of the problem of objectively assessing suffering in animals . It is argued that preference tests may be one way of throwing light on this difficult problem . This paper describes some experiments on habitat preference in domestic hens. No preference was observed between a commercial battery cage and a large pen when hens were given continuous access to the two . A simultaneous choice between a battery cage and an outside hen-run showed a clear preference for the run, but choice was strongly influenced by prior experience . The strength of the run preference was investigated by `pitting' the run against food and access to companions .
Introduction
To many scientists the question `Do hens suffer in battery cages?' is invalid, as it is a question about an animal's subjective feelings and the subjective feelings of animals are not directly accessible to scientific investigation. We may look for signs of physical ill-health and we can study behaviour, but we can never know for certain whether these observable symptoms are accompanied by subjective consciousness . We may study animals as if they were machines and try to discover what the behaviour machinery is by looking at the relation between inputs and outputs . There will be no place in such models for subjective feelings . But just because we study animals as if they were machines which merely behaved and felt nothing, does not mean that that is all they are . As Griffin (1976) points out :
It is very easy for scientists to slip into the passive assumption that phenomena with which their customary methods cannot deal effectively are unimportant or even non-existent.' There are at least two reasons for believing that the subjective feelings of animals are both important and very far from non-existent .
The first reason comes from the way we react to other people. Exactly the same arguments apply to other human beings as to animals . Strictly, we can never know that other people have mental experiences . We cannot do an experiment to demonstrate that another human being is conscious or has feelings remotely like our own any more than we can for a hen or a chimpanzee . But commonsense and intuition tell us that other human beings probably do think and feel as we ourselves do . Their behaviour and physiology are sufficiently similar to our own that we are quite prepared to accept this without 1034 the need for logical proof. We base our ideas of morality, such as not to eat people, kill them or torture them, on this commonsense view rather than on strict logic . There is a'common ground' suffering, pleasure, pain, which most people accept as being universals of human experience. But must this common ground stop at the boundaries of our own species? If we accept the evolutionary continuity between man and other animals for physiology, biochemistry and at least some aspects of behaviour, why not mental experiences too (Brophy 1972 ; Griffin 1976 )? Ryder (1971 and Singer (1976) use the term 'speciesism' by analogy with racism . Many animals, particularly mammals and birds, seem to have all the basic nervous apparatus for feeling pain and experiencing emotion . Commonsense suggests that they can suffer . Of course, we cannot be certain about this, but neither can we about other people. If animals do suffer from some of our scientific experiments or from the ways in which we keep them for commercial profit, then it seems important on moral grounds to take this into account .
The second reason is a more biological one, and comes from consideration of the possible survival value of subjective feelings . We are accustomed to asking questions about the functional significance of the shape, colouring and behaviour of an animal . It is reasonable to assume that subjective feelings too evolved because animals which possessed them were fitter than those which did not. Exactly why they should have been fitter is one of the most profound mysteries of biology, and although various suggestions have been made, e .g. that they aided simulation of the future (Wall 1974), communication or learning, the full reasons are not
